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1. Introduction: framing a London case study 
London still is a somewhat ‘unique city’ as Rasmussen (1937) claimed, in several ways that 
impact on its capacity for self-governance.  Notable among these is its international 
orientation – both historically as the power centre of a great trading and colonial empire, and 
more recently as the most globalised of financial centres – placing powerful demands (beyond 
those of its citizenry) on its ordering and development. And yet, the organic character of its 
evolution, which is what particularly struck Rasmussen, might also make it the epitome of a 
post-industrial metropolis, unique in its early experience of dilemmas that all large and complex 
city-regions will come to face, if not to resolve.    
From a French perspective, at least, this kind of development (‘more by fortune than design’ in 
Hebbert’s [1998] phrase) might be seen as simply reflecting a particular British cultural bias in 
favour of ‘muddling-through’, rather than harnessing state power to a rational ordering of this 
complexity. There is a flavour of this in applause for Rasmussen’s suggestion that “London had 
benefited from fragmentation, checks and balances in its system of governance”, which resisted 
modernist ‘clean sweep’ planning and thus preserved a variety in the city’s urban fabric that 
came to be widely valued (Hebbert, 1973, 203)   
But, putting aside questions of aesthetic judgement and (for the moment) the wider stakes 
associated with more/less ‘statist’ approaches to development, this particular characterisation 
of post-war London planning exposes some issues which are central to how the discussion of 
evolving metropolitan governance will be framed in this chapter. The most basic of these is the 
proposition that governance (i.e. literally ‘steering’) of any social/spatial system, always and 
anywhere, involves an amalgam of three distinct kinds of process operating in and through:  
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• formal authority structures;  
• decentralised market-type interactions between individuals pursuing their separate 
interests; and  
• informal institutions, involving more/less widely shared norms, senses of identity, trust, 
habits of co-operation/obstruction and understandings of the context in which they are 
operating.  
Reforming a governance system to cope with changing conditions is generally understood to 
involve some shake-up of existing divisions of labour (e.g. between ministries, professions, the 
hierarchy of spatial units and public/private agency).  For this to succeed, however, reform 
processes need to engage with the behaviour/ dynamics of markets and informal institutions, 
as well as with redesign of authority structures (Gordon, 2006) .   
A second proposition is that the metropolitan context poses distinct challenges for governance 
which are now crucially importance but especially difficult because of the internal complexity of 
these regions. This characteristic is key to their expected contribution to economic 
competitiveness, but makes them unmanageable through inherited governmental structures. 
Three basic aspects of this complexity are:  
• a high degree of diversity (in populations, skills, economic activities and lifestyles);  
• multiplexed patterns of interaction among these (dense, uneven and over widely 
different ranges, from neighbourhood to trans-regional scale); and, as their counterpart 
• a potential for much greater areal differentiation, in populations and interests, across 
territories of politically significant size (for service provision/representation etc.).    
A final proposition is that, despite this complexity, some key forms of structural conflict are 
always liable to impact upon the capacity for effective metropolitan governance. These apply 
whether they are openly recognised or repressed, but the consequences in terms of 
functionality, responsiveness and transparency are expected to be substantially worse in the 
latter case. 
Against the background of this set of general ideas about the metropolitan governance 
problem, consideration of the London experience has several points of potential interest, both 
for other metropoles which are coming to share some of its characteristics, and for those with 
evident differences in their economic, political or cultural attributes. One reason for making this 
claim is simply that London has (almost certainly) the longest experience of wrestling with the 
problems of how a large, diverse and spatially extended urban agglomeration can sustain itself, 
in economic, environmental, social and political terms. This goes back in London’s case to the 
middle of the 19
th
 century, when it was the largest centre within the first modern nation to 
have a majority-urban population. And the recurring debate as to whether the entire functional 
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region around a major city could and should be governed by a single authority has a starting 
point in H.G. Wells’ (1903) argument that the delocalising effects of modern transport networks 
around London meant that one such ‘mammoth municipality’ should administer the whole 
territory within an hour’s reach of the centre.  
A second point of interest in the London case, lies in its sheer size, relative to most other 
European centres, which both exposes and amplifies the difference that scale and growth can 
be expected to make to the governance problem. This has encouraged social and political 
differentiation of neighbourhoods, suburbs and of some broader tracts of the city-region which 
have acquired distinct political identities. But, as is easily seen in this case, the organic character 
of development means that the actual territories occupied by specific groups have shifted as 
the city has expanded, with classic processes of invasion and succession producing periodic 
points of friction, and various forms of locally defensive politics. These have taken a particular 
form in outer areas, close to the frontier of development for an expanding city, which (on the 
traditional Anglo-American model) are occupied by more affluent classes (prioritising space 
over accessibility) with more political weight to deploy. 
A third notable feature, where London’s position is even more distinctive – interesting in its 
difference, more than its anticipation of a general trend – is that of the stop put to this spatial 
expansion in the 1940s through imposition of an (effectively enforced) Green Belt. This might 
be better characterised as a London Levée since, after raising the level of development inside 
its bounds, further residential demand lapped over it, settling in a range of centres/areas 
substantially further out. That produced a much more extended, complex and governmentally 
fragmented London region, rather than compacting development within a recognisably distinct 
capital city.  Debates continue as to whether the outcome was good or bad, though this key 
episode well illustrates the likelihood of unintended consequences from authoritative planning 
when the power and responsiveness of the market dimension of governance is ignored. But, 
and this is the fourth point of likely general interest, despite a failure (over this long term) to 
satisfactorily resolve the issue of London metropolitan governance, the region now seems more 
than ever to be an economic success story. There are very evident and worsening problems of 
housing affordability, exacerbating those of widening social inequality – but overall the 
metropolitan region seems much less obviously dysfunctional than the irrationalities of its 
governance structure might lead an outside researcher to expect. 
In the remainder of the chapter, the potential significance of this case is teased out a little more 
carefully by firstly reviewing the evolution of London’s political economy, spatial structure and 
governmental arrangements since the mid-19
th
 century (section 2), and then taking this as a 
backcloth to draw out key dimensions of conflict affecting governance of the metropolis  and 
how these relate to current issues about relations with central government on the one hand (in 
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terms of fiscal devolution and the idea of London as a city-state), and with authorities in outer 
parts of its functional economic region (section 3)  A short conclusion then returns to the issue 
of the need for any reform of metropolitan governance (here as elsewhere) to address all three 
dimensions of governance (authority, markets and informal institutions) and their inter-relation 
(section 4) 
 
2. The Development of the Metropolitan Issue 1850-2015. 
In the field of British local government studies, before this was displaced by urban politics 
and/or policy studies in the 1970s, a strongly historical perspective was associated, on the one 
hand, with a charting of progress in the development of responsibilities, administrative 
structures and their legal bases and, on the other, with some nostalgia for days when 
independent local ways of doing things were less subject to ‘interference’ from activist, 
impatient and conformity-seeking central governments. These narratives have generally been 
overtaken by more analytic approaches of various kinds.  But there are still some strong 
reasons for taking a long view on contemporary metropolitan governance issues. One involves 
the sources of path-dependence in them, in the ways that patterns of demographic, social and 
political differentiation evolve in and around particular metropolitan regions, alongside ideas 
about identity, solidarity, trustworthiness and interdependence.  Another is because 
structural dimensions of conflict, and the power resources applied to these, not always evident 
on the surface or in the particularities of particular episodes, are more clearly recognisable in 
patterns of behaviour, non-decision-making and outcomes over the long run (cf. Saunier, 2008).  
We start then by looking at key changes in the London region since the mid 19
th
 century, when 
the metropolitan governance issue emerged, in its political economy, spatial organisation and 
formal government. These are looked at in turn, rather than in a single narrative because they 
have followed quite different rhythms: with three distinct eras in the first case, some evolving 
long run trends in the second, and clusters of events in the third.   
 
2a Three eras in modern London’s Political Economy
1
 
Through the latter part of the 19
th
 century, London’s economic role could be characterised as 
that of an Imperial City. Though growing rather rapidly, it lacked the most dynamic sectors of 
                                                          
1
 Relevant spatial definitions of the ‘London’ economy shift between these periods (as section 2b explains). In the 
first era this is effectively contained within what is now Inner London; for most of the second it is what is now 
Greater London; while for the third it involves a greatly extended region. For consistency, however, references to 
aggregate characteristics/changes in this section all implicitly relate to Greater London.  
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contemporary industry and the kind of factory economy that had developed in northern cities, 
closer to key mineral/energy resources. Instead it specialised in services and in artisanal forms 
of manufacture, linked particularly to the processing of imperial imports and to serving the  
demands of its elite residents. Typically these activities were very competitive and/or at the 
mercy of strong international trade cycles, so the jobs they offered working class Londoners 
tended to be insecure (with a substantial minority of casual jobs e.g. in the docks), not 
conducive to development either of stable lifestyles or solidaristic working class organisations 
(such as the trade unions, co-operatives and nonconformist chapels of the industrial regions). 
London’s culture and patterns of interaction were more individualist, opportunist and risky. The 
risks were not purely individual, however: unemployment and housing crises in years of trade 
recession exposed a potential for social conflict which worried the ruling and middle classes, 
and prepared the ground eventually for planning/welfare state responses, in the next century 
(Stedman Jones, 1971).  
By then, however, external economic and technological developments had started to transform 
London’s economic role into that of the Fordist Industrial Capital, which characterised it 
through most of the 20th century. With industrial change making access to markets (rather 
than resources) the key location factor, and with a curtailment of global trade, London’s 
position at the heart of the largest domestic market made it the most attractive UK location for 
a new wave of light Ford-style industries. As with the city’s burgeoning (private and public) 
bureaucracies, these factories offered (and required) both bases for more stable work/social 
organisations and support for a more planned approach to urban and social infrastructure 
(including a much increased role for the local state), as well as greatly extended market 
relations. During the later part of this Fordist era (from about 1960), a combination of 
corporate planning, market forces and falling transport/communication costs led increasingly to 
new spatial divisions of labour (within as well as between firms) in which routinisable 
functions/jobs were transferred from London to cheaper locations. This transformation 
essentially reflected success in the city’s economy, rather than weakness as often assumed, 
though it did radically alter its occupational mix (Buck et al., 1986).   
That economic role, and the sorts of order associated with it, were in their turn, displaced (after 
the 1970s) by another round of restructuring in the (inter)national economy, engendering a 
second shift in London’s economic role - to one usually characterised as the Global City (though 
this is a loaded term, as will be explained later). At the aggregate level this was associated with 
a turnaround in London employment and population trends, plus a sharp increase in the 
earnings/productivity gap as compared with the rest of the country (Buck et al., 2002). 
Particular reasons for this included both the fact that some old trends had run their course (as 
the goods-related sectors became vanishingly small) and external shocks causing new influxes 
of overseas immigrants, (firstly from conflict zones, and then from the EU accession countries). 
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Beyond these, however, a more fundamental global shift in the intensity, scope and form of 
market competition seems to have brought a revaluation of a broad set of urban assets 
(including diversity, flexibility, innovativeness, international orientation etc.) in which London 
and a number of other great cities had traditionally excelled.  And the deregulatory response 
of UK governments to the new competitive environment (under Thatcher in the 1980s, but also 
New Labour in the late 1990s) intensified these effects, boosting the overall performance of the 
London economy both directly and via increased levels of personal inequality (from which it 
was a net beneficiary).   
In a series of respects then, this set of qualitative changes - which included a higher degree of 
volatility (up to the 2007/8 financial crisis, from which London enjoyed unexpected 
protection) and labour market flexibility - involved some degree of reversion to features of the 
late 19
th
 century (Imperial City) era as well as extrapolation of trends from that of the Fordist 
Capital (Buck et al., 2002).  Enthusiasm for strategic regional planning also faded, although 
development control remained (on a more localist basis than in the Fordist era): these were 
national trends but with particular significance in the London metropolitan context.  
 
2b Spatial Expansion and Metropolitanisation.   
The notion of a functionally integrated metropolitan regional system is not a simple one, and 
became much less so during the course of these three eras. At its simplest it involves a set of 
areas/activities which are (at the time) strongly linked with those in the urban core - via 
input-output, information or housing/labour market connections. Subsequently, however, 
around a major centre such as London, these secondary areas develop their own strong 
inter-connections and sources of strength, contributing to (as well as drawing from) 
metropolitan-wide agglomeration economies. Many of the ramifications of this extended 
region are readily managed through sets of overlapping markets, but their lack of transparency 
makes effective adaptation much harder for both formal authorities and informal institutions.   
The spatial extent of such functional urban regions (FURs) can go well beyond that of the 
morphological region (of continuous urbanisation), and whether that around London extends 
out for just 60 kms. or twice as far is a matter of judgement. Even taking a conservative view of 
this, however, growth trends across London’s metropolitan FUR have been clearly positive, for 
both residents and jobs, through the eras just discussed – though its inner areas will have 
shrunk in these terms over much of this time. Even at the level of Greater London, recorded 
population numbers fell very substantially over the half century from the late 1930s (and Inner 
London from much earlier), as did employment for about 25 years from the late 1950s (Buck et 
al., 2002).     
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The common driving force behind these decentralising trends, and hence also the key factor in 
the region’s spatial extension, was a demand for lower densities of occupation, both from 
private residents (as their incomes grew) and from businesses (as labour productivity 
increased). At a micro-level the processes primarily involved residential moves by young 
families in/entering owner-occupation, and relocations of goods-related operations or back 
offices.  But life-cycle factors cancel out in the long run, and most of the net employment shift 
occurred through differences in the growth rates of (non-moving) firms in inner versus outer 
areas. What chiefly mattered in both cases was that the supply of space was inelastic in areas 
closer to the centre.  
For 30 or so years, such a dispersal of jobs and housing was consistent with a coherent 
metropolitan planning strategy developed during the war years, when a National Government  
favoured radical approaches to both physical and social reconstruction. In particular, 
Abercrombie’s 1944 London Region Plan, provided for relocation of a large number of 
Londoners to planned settlements beyond the Green Belt, with their balanced development 
being assured by industrial development controls elsewhere, and via a mover selection scheme. 
In many ways this functioned impressively, but the scale of development of New Towns was 
never nearly sufficient on its own to enable the required outward shift.  
Fortunately, market forces were working in much the same direction, and a very much larger 
number of Londoners in search of more space, somewhere within commuting range, moved 
out independently to private housing in other destinations within the London commuting belt 
not specifically designated in any plan. Even at the peak of the New Town and town expansion 
programmes these accounted for just 15% of London's shrinkage in jobs and residents (Buck et 
al., 1986, 59). Unlike the (planned) movers to these towns who were meant to take up new jobs 
in self-contained communities, the spontaneous out-movers almost all intended to keep their 
London jobs.  Fortunately (again), since market forces steered jobs as well as housing to outer 
areas where land was available, these out-movers eventually tended to find suitable 
employment opportunities closer to hand, keeping the volume of in-commuting under control, 
and avoiding substantial local labour market imbalances (Buck et al., 1986).          .  
The scale of outward movement from Greater London – involving net migration and job loss 
rates of around 1% p.a. – became a matter of controversy in the 1970s when GLC planners and 
other commentators came to see it as worsening social polarisation and concentrations of 
deprivation, particularly within inner London. There were worries too that policies of managed 
dispersal were weakening the city’s base in ways that threatened an uncontrollable decline. 
Subsequent research evidence suggested that this view was mistaken, in relation to: the roles 
of planning versus market forces; the judgement that job losses signified a weakened London 
economy, rather than spatial adjustments to economic growth pressures; and that areas of 
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higher unemployment reflected local job losses, rather than simply residential concentrations 
(in cheaper housing areas) of the population groups most vulnerable to labour market risks 
(Buck et al., 1986). The fact that overlapping commuting areas across the metropolitan region 
rapidly diffused the effect of sub-regional shocks was (and is) not readily appreciated.     
In the early phases of decentralisation, the economic role of the outer areas was primarily to 
support the economy of the core through assuring a labour supply: first directly through 
commuting; and then increasingly through accommodating support functions such as 
back-offices which employed a growing local labour force in relatively routine jobs. As the 
process advanced, the mix of activities broadened, the depth of local skill pools increased, with 
a much enhanced potential for interconnections among businesses outside Greater London, 
and less simple dependence on the strength of the core. Towns 50 kms or more from the centre 
now attracted/generated types of highly innovative activity and international offices which 
needed face-to-face access to metropolitan actors, but less frequently than traditional business 
services did. Patterns of connection and communication thus became a lot more complex, and 
hence also the demands for orbital/eccentric travel, in a region whose growth (and spatial 
extension) had been structured around a radial public transport network with top-down 
planning. How the collective economic interests of this extended region could be understood 
and effectively represented also became increasingly uncertain (Gordon and Travers, 2010).  
Population decentralisation has had two important political ramifications. At the local level, 
population shifts alter the social mix of residents, often bringing in people of a lower class into 
traditionally conservative areas (especially where new social housing is involved).  At the 
'London' level the corresponding issue is one of increasing under-bounding
2
. In party political 
terms this means that the core 'city-wide' authority with fixed boundaries becomes increasingly 
likely to be Labour controlled
3
. In relation to substantive political issues it means that the most 
obvious areas for new housing development (in accessible but unconstrained sites) are 
increasingly likely to lie outside the ambit of that authority, in areas with more conservative 
residents.      
 
    
      
                                                          
2
 ‘Under-bounding’ refers to the tendency for urban administrative units to exclude adjacent areas that are 
effectively integrated, in physical or economic terms, with the urban core. Such underbounding commonly arises 
because while de facto urban areas continuously expand, de jure ones are more rigid, owing to legal inertia and/or 
politically vested interests.  
3
 As with the London County Council, which was controlled by the (conservative) Municipal Reform Party from 
1907-1934, but then by Labour right until its abolition in 1985.  
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  2c: Government structures and strategies 
London government in a formal sense had two foundations, first with the Roman establishment 
of Londinium (around 50 A.D.), and then the Norman re-settlement and chartering of the City 
of London
4
 (around 1067).  Both involved essentially the same rather small walled area/port, 
in what is now the primary financial district. In the millennium between these two settlements, 
the city’s population was very greatly reduced, but a range of other centres grew up nearby, 
including Westminster where the last Anglo-Saxon English kings established a royal seat, and 
Southwark on the south side of the river. Though areas in Middlesex were subsequently 
administered with the City for fiscal/judicial purposes, the City Corporation continually resisted 
an enlargement to incorporate new areas – or later their separate incorporation. After 
Londinium, there was thus no city-wide government until the end of the 19
th
 century – nor any 
larger walled area.  
The basic local unit of government through this long era was the historic one of the parish (or 
vestry), with some grouping into district boards still leaving about such 75 entities across 
London, of varying sizes and forms of organisation, together with several times as many 
special-purpose authorities. When this fragmented system proved clearly inadequate to the 
needs of a large and growing city, a Metropolitan Board of Works was established (in 1855) 
with members nominated by the bigger vestries, or district groupings of them, with 
responsibility for provision of infrastructure across the contemporary metropolitan area 
(including roads, sewerage, bridges, river embankments etc.). It carried this out rather 
effectively, though without the democratic control of new borough and county authorities 
outside London. London in its turn did acquire an elected County Council (the LCC) in 1889, 
responsible for providing a full range of services and facilities across this same metropolitan 
area (that now identified as Inner London, and somewhat under-bounded from the outset). Its 
scope and the metropolitan ambitions of its Progressive leadership soon aroused antipathy 
from conservative localists, leading central government in 1899 to create a second tier of 
Metropolitan Borough authorities, taking over the responsibilities of the vestries (Davis, 1988) . 
Though restructured in 1965 this borough tier (with populations now around 270,000) remains 
as the most durable element of London government – apart from the City which still operates, 
in its own distinct fashion (Travers, 2015).  
The LCC was the standard bearer for metropolitanism, however, responsible for the first of the 
Abercrombie Plans in 1943, and then for both its urban renewal aspects and administration of 
                                                          
4
 Following common practice, capitalised references to ‘the City’ in this chapter relate either to the City of London 
Corporation, which still governs 'the square mile', or to the core of UK financial services activities traditionally 
located there (though now with overspill into new Docklands developments) – rather than to any wider definition 
of the city (such as Greater London). The symbolic head of the City is its Lord Mayor, not to be confused with the 
elected Mayor of London who (since 2000) has been the executive head of the Greater London Authority.     
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the selection scheme which got Londoners out to the post-war New and Expanded Towns. By 
that time its boundaries were almost a century out of date, covering just a quarter of the land 
inside the Green Belt. The outer bounds of that belt were allowed to expand substantially over 
the next 20 years in response to ad hoc applications from county authorities, turning it into 
more of a blanket on development across the metropolitan region than just a barrier to sprawl.  
From the mid-1960s on, however, some regional planning initiatives started, including: 
• a Standing Conference of South East Regional Planning authorities (SERPLAN); 
established in 1962 as a collaborative research and monitoring venture by local 
government (and lasting until 2010);  
• a 1964 central-government South East Study, the first of several addressing the question 
of how/where this region’s growing population was to be housed; followed soon by 
• a regional strategy from the South East’s Economic Planning Council (SEEPC), one of a 
set, centrally appointed but broadly constituted, linked to a (Labour government’s) 
national economic planning initiative; and then  
• a joint central-SEEPC-SERPLAN Strategic Plan for the South East (1970, with a follow up 
in 1974).  
Like their successors under New Labour (in the late 1990s), these cast substantial light on the 
strategic issues, but had only very limited impact on real development or investment patterns 
determined in more ad hoc fashion by central departments and/or local authorities. 
The more significant development was enlargement of the pan-London authority, with the LCC 
being replaced, in 1965, by a Greater London Council (GLC), covering about 5 times its area 
(including the continuously urbanised city-region and a small amount of Green Belt), with the 
tier of borough authorities also extended across this area. The political effect of adding the 
outer areas was to produce a much more even competition between the two major parties, 
with GLC control oscillating - generally at odds with half the boroughs, and often also with the 
national government of the day
5
. This potential for political disagreement mattered because (in 
the first case) housing powers/responsibilities were split between the GLC and the boroughs, 
and (in the second) because the strategic ambitions of the GLC in its later years, with more 
radical labour leadership, moved beyond physical planning into industrial and economic 
strategy, where it openly challenged (Margaret Thatcher's) national policy (Buck et al., 1986; 
Pimlott and Rao, 2002).      
Key elements in the GLC’s remit were meant to be planning, transport and infrastructure, but 
preparation, review and approval of the (one and only) statutory Greater London Development 
                                                          
5
 Each GLC election was actually won by the (then) main national opposition party.  
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Plan was a very long drawn-out process. This was partly for bureaucratic/procedural reasons, 
but also because of controversial urban motorway proposals (withdrawn during the Enquiry 
into the Plan, though without replacement), and shifting judgements about growth trends. By 
the time it was finally approved (in 1976), GLC leaders were much more concerned about 
shrinking population and employment. Their representations led a year later to abandonment 
by central government of the population decentralisation strategy. By the time a New left 
leadership (under Ken Livingstone) had taken over in 1981, emphasising more interventionist 
approaches to boosting growth, the GLDP had become an irrelevance. 
Impatient of the provocative challenge which the GLC now presented, right on her doorstep, to 
her personal political project, the Prime Minister (Margaret Thatcher) abolished the Council in 
1986, along with the other six English conurbation authorities. Some services were transferred 
to boroughs, while co-ordinating functions generally passed either to central government or to 
committees of the boroughs. In particular, responsibility for strategic planning guidance was 
taken over by a government minister, working from ‘advice’ prepared by a London Planning 
Advisory Committee, of borough representatives, with a small secretariat (located in an 
unfashionable suburb). Unpromising though this sounds, it actually became a high point in 
collaborative planning within Greater London.  
More generally, the years that followed were ones of high activity in relation to (at least) 
debate about London’s development. An unmatched series of high profile consultancy reports 
were produced, for various clients/sponsors, with a particular focus on London’s competitive 
position vis-a-vis other world cities, but also involving the emergent agenda of balanced 
development (across environment, economy and equity)
6
. This activity was encouraged by a 
new (national) sensitivity to the international competitive position of London’s advanced 
services (including City financial services, which had been deregulated in the Big Bang of 1986), 
notably in the context of the Single European Market initiative (due for completion in 1992).  
Something like a ‘network mode of governance’, started to emerge in this era, with the 
encouragement of central government (under Thatcher’s Conservative successor, John Major), 
which established a Cabinet Committee on London, backed the development of a 
central-London focused business pressure group (London First), and then a broader London 
Pride Partnership initiative, involving local authorities and voluntary organisations as well as 
firms, via local partnerships (Travers, 2004). 
A Government Office for London (established in 1994) made some contribution to this, but the 
wider scheme of introducing such regional foci (with an integrative Single Regeneration Budget) 
                                                          
6
 including London Planning Advisory Committee/Coopers and Lybrand Deloitte (1991), 
Llewelyn Davies Planning /Bartlett School of Planning (1996), Llewelyn Davies Planning et al., 
(1999) 
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on a uniform basis (and scale) across the country saw the (functional) Greater South East region 
now divided into three administrative territories, with a London region bordered both by 
Eastern and South East regions. The divisive effect of this structure was exacerbated after 1997 
by the New Labour government’s addition of separate Regional Development Agencies, 
Regional Assemblies (mostly of local authority nominees) and eventually Regional Spatial 
Strategies in the latter two (rather artificial) ‘regions’.   
The 15 years after GLC abolition (the inter-regnum period) saw the greatest ‘turnaround’ in 
population and employment growth within Greater London, for reasons which are largely 
coincidental. But (more relevantly) these were also years of increased infrastructure investment 
- notably in Docklands renewal, driven forward by a single-purpose London Docklands 
Development Corporation, imposed by the Thatcher government, after the boroughs’ 
prolonged failure to agree on a scheme. And, conceivably, some of this investment boom was 
boosted by the fact that central government (and its ‘market oriented’ strategy) could now take 
the credit for visible (and symbolic) changes in the capital.  
One initiative of this period (actually from the Major government) did seek to link development 
inside and outside London. This (extremely ambitious) Thames Gateway project, involving a 70 
km stretch along both banks of the Thames, has however failed (up to now), because of a great 
tangle of agencies (across three regions), and the lack of a comparably single-minded 
commitment from central government. Travers (2014) notes that responses to critical reviews 
of the governance structures were ‘consistently inadequate’, and observes that: 
‘governments create powerful governance institutions when they want to be confident 
of delivering on a particular objective or project’ (p. 90).  
This seems never to have really been the case with Thames Gateway during the past 20 years       
During the interregnum (and its years in opposition), the Labour Party retained a commitment 
to restoring some London authority (if not one liable to challenge central government). The 
business lobby, in particular, also thought London needed a leadership figure. When the party 
eventually returned to office in 1997, under the banner of New Labour, it worked to establish a 
new form of Greater London Authority, of a ‘strong Mayor’ form (with a one-person elected 
executive and a weak supervisory Assembly), but with a purely strategic agenda, a limited 
budget and minimal capacity to finance infrastructure projects on an independent basis. It 
clearly did not intend to risk the same challenges that the GLC had posed to Margaret Thatcher. 
The Mayor’s de facto power, even at the outset, was rather greater than this implies, because 
they were also sponsors for several agencies, including the London version of the (newly 
created) regional Development Agencies (the LDA), and (crucially) of Transport for London 
(TFL), a more powerful version of the London Transport Executive, which (in various forms) had 
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operated since 1933.  And in the years since the first Mayor - Ken Livingstone, now less radical 
than business-like - was elected (as an Independent), in 2000, he and his Conservative 
successor, Boris Johnson, have worked quite successfully to build their powers and financing 
capacity. Partly through personal projection (and hosting of the 2012 Summer Olympics) the 
prestige and influence of elected Mayors have exceeded those of earlier London leaders, and 
the sequence of London Plans/updates produced since 2000 clearly outdoes in efficiency and 
intelligibility the record of other (peacetime) London administrations. Translating these into 
action has been less impressive, notably in relation to housebuilding. But a congestion charge 
was successfully brought in for the central area, Transport for London has made major progress 
in integrating the system, and (after decades of central government indecision) a massive Cross 
Rail project is underway boosting the capacity of East-West links through the central business 
district (CBD).       
The Greater London Authority/Mayor survived the transition to a Conservative-led Coalition 
government in 2010 unscathed, though elsewhere the whole apparatus of regionalism was 
swept away, to be replaced by a (somewhat ambiguous) principle of localism.  It was 
ambiguous partly because ministers retained a power to intervene, and to prescribe a new 
(slimmed down) national planning framework; and partly because it was unclear how far this, 
and removal of regional strategies (outside Greater London), was meant to transfer power to 
local residents, or to developers.    
In the last few years, a well-organised Manchester metropolitan machine has made 
considerable progress toward catching up with London in the devolution stakes, securing the 
first of what are now to be (under the post-coalition Conservative government) a series of City 
Deals for provincial cities willing to establish elected metropolitan mayoralties (Gordon and 
Harloe, 2016). Perhaps stimulated by this, and in conjunction with a first long-term 
Infrastructure Plan, a London Finance Commission carried out a careful examination of how 
(and why) the city might receive a substantial degree of fiscal autonomy (LFC, 2013) – though 
without any positive response yet. On the issue of collaboration with (and among) authorities in 
outer parts of its extended region, there has also been a bit of progress, linked to a growing 
sense that, with accelerating population growth and stagnant house-building rates, London was 
very unlikely to meet its housing targets. The independent Inspector of its last round of Plan 
amendments recommended action in this direction (in late 2014), toward which some steps 
have been taken, with a first ‘summit’ of regional leaders, despite a government warning that 
no form of regional planning was to be resurrected!        
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3. The Politics of Metropolitan Governance in the London Regions 
 
3a. The Social Access Politics of Spatial Externalities and Specific Issues 
 
The account of the metropolitanisation (or regionalisation) of London, since the 1940s, as 
sketched above, suggests that - within a radial transport network laid down before then , and 
the spatial interruption imposed at the start of this period by the London Levée (aka Green 
Belt), it has been preponderantly driven and shaped by market forces. That might suggest a 
Williams’ (1971) style ‘social access’ view of metropolitan politics, as simply filling the gap left by 
the ‘failures’ of those markets in relation to spatial externalities, by collective action to regulate 
the more important side-effects of personal/business decisions for others living and/or 
operating relatively close to them.   
 
This is not so simple in practice, because (for different kinds of effect) ‘relatively close’ might 
mean anything between ‘just down the street’ and across the whole metro region. But 
imperfect versions of this kind of territorial politics clearly do operate at various spatial scales 
within the extended London region.  Most characteristically, they involve a development 
scheme of some kind, offering some potential socio-economic benefits across a wide area (e.g. 
some improvement in housing affordability, or in air services) -  but with negative 
environmental effects of some kind concentrated within a smaller locality, where NIMBYist 
opposition is easier to mobilise than a more diffuse coalition of prospective supporters. For 
really major developments, triggering interest from the state and/or major business interests, 
weightier actors may be involved on either side, but with a similarly contingent kind of social 
access politics, related to the specific case.     
 
The big current example involves the recommendation by a central-government-appointed 
(Davies) Commission that regional/national needs for greater 'hub' airport capacity should be 
met by adding an extra runway to Heathrow airport, located in the western suburbs, right on 
the edge of Greater London (UKAC, 2015). This is actually the latest episode in a 50 year saga of 
indecision - including a previous (Roskill) Commission in 1971, with recommendations that were 
rejected by one government, in favour of a more radical (and expensive) Thames Estuary 
scheme, only for that to be overturned by the next government, which chose a more 
incrementalist path. This time round, the elected Mayor vigorously promoted a similar kind of 
Thames Estuary scheme, which again got short shrift from the experts.  As before, however, 
the issue remains firmly in the hands of central government, which again faces political 
challenges from representatives of immediately affected areas.  In this case they include 
leading Conservative politicians with seats around Heathrow - including the Mayor and 5 other 
Cabinet ministers, plus another who is a Mayoral candidate for 2016.   
 
3b Continuing Structural Conflict around Key Cleavages in the Metropolitan System 
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There are other strategic aspect of metropolitan politics in this region, however, which cut 
across such situation-specific mobilisations, and bring into play more structured forms of 
alliance, reflecting broader interests in ways the region should develop and in the types of 
politics that should prevail. These involve a number of dimensions of conflict, which - whether 
openly expressed or operating in a more repressed / concealed fashion – underlie the continued 
muddling (through) of metro governance, in and around London, from right back in the 19
th
 
century.     
 
First among these (particularly within London), has been that of ‘metropolitan’ versus ‘localist’ 
forms of politics which differ in their interests, participants, styles and structures (Young, 1975) .  
Even within the same generic issue area – economic development, environmental sustainability 
or social cohesion, say – localist politics is addressed to more concrete and specific cases, their 
outcomes and to experiences of these, rather than to broader, more strategic and/or 
analytically based versions of them.  From a more metropolitan perspective, this way of seeing 
political issues, can seem short-sighted, narrowly self-interested (even anti-social) and blind to 
wider processes that more powerfully shape outcomes for local residents or businesses. But it 
(also) reflects a distrust of remote actors, their interests and ways of doing politics, and a 
positive valuation of locally-based identities, relations, and the particular features of places 
where people were born or (more often in this region) chose to live. In their role as local 
residents, many people adopting a more distant, abstracted and ‘cooler’ view in other parts of 
their lives (and other places, in the case of suburban or exurban commuters) may well share this 
orientation – particularly where it fits in with their perceived interest as property owners.  But, 
in general, active participants in local politics are likely to self-select in terms of a preference for 
thinking about issues in concrete, particularistic terms – as well as feeling a stronger stake in 
local outcomes – with a reverse bias operating at the metropolitan scale.     
 
The particular significance of this cleavage to the ‘muddled’ development of governance in the 
region reflects a positive association between strong (and/or strongly expressed) forms of 
localism and middle class suburbanism.  Indeed one of the classic aims of suburbanism in the 
British/London context has been to use physical separation to protect a particularly valued form 
of localism (Young, 1975).  Hence the classic conflicts in the London region have been between 
a metropolitan authority and one or more middle-class conservative suburbs, resisting some 
threat to their way of life. These include: the initial reaction to the ‘megalomania’ of early LCC 
Progressives, which led to introduction of boroughs as a counterbalance to protect (particularly) 
suburban localists; and two sets of legal battles between (the outer borough of) Bromley and 
the Greater London Council, over GLC plans for social housing in the borough, and later their 
‘Fares Fair’ initiative to subsidise Tube travel (Young and Kramer, 1978; Travers, 2004).    
 
Intersecting with this values-based cleavage is another (more conventional) one, in terms of 
class and material interest, notably in relation to property stakes, labour market position and 
business size. As well as entering openly into politics at all scales, and shaping the outcomes that 
markets produce, they also clearly contribute to informal governance through 'imagined'  
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communities (Anderson, 1991) , and constructions of 'their' interests and relations to each 
other. Though frequently taken as common sense, these are not simply factual, and often quite 
misleading.  
 
An example is the idea that places within the metropolitan region have some clearly discernible 
economic interest (maybe linked to a prominent industry), which if actively pursued will benefit 
all in the area, and might allow residents of a less prosperous community to catch up 
economically. What both theory and evidence show, however, is that neither are likely to be 
true within a region as closely integrated as this one is. Even the core GL economy is not actually 
dominated by its 'global city' functions (Buck et al., 2002). And variations in living standards 
across the metro region almost entirely reflect the varying social and demographic mixes of 
those who get to live in different places. On the other hand, property values and rents, do vary 
considerably just on the basis of location. So it is reasonable to expect that 
promotional/regenerational policies will affect these – and thus indirectly who can afford to live 
in different areas – much more than the standard of living of those who presently live there. 
And that such 'territorially competitive' policies will be most actively pursued, shaped and 
advocated by those with a stake in local property values.   
 
Taking into account some key ways these factors have worked in the London region suggests a 
need to distinguish between two different kinds of both localist and metropolitan politics, 
involving: efficiency or equity oriented metro politics; and residential comfort or territorially 
competitive localist politics (Figure 1). Commonly, these are treated not as alternatives, but as 
complementary aspects of single approaches, co-existing in the rationales provided for 
particular localist or metropolitan policies. But, since they are promoted by different interests, 
such complementarity is at best a matter of faith, often serving as a disguise for the prime basis 
of the policy and politics that are being promoted.  
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Figure 1:  Foci of Metropolitan / Local Politics 
  
 
Thirdly, among the structural bases of conflict in the region is the continuing tension 
between national government and London’s political leadership, going beyond the 
normal/natural levels of rivalry between tiers of authority.  Something of this kind 
seems common with capital cities, perhaps because (as Campbell (2000) suggests) capital 
cities naturally stand in some way as representations of their nation, while rarely being 
representative in terms of the social, cultural and/ political values prevailing there. In the 
2015 UK general election, for example, most of London (with its unusually high 
concentration of both university graduates and ethnicities other than ‘white British’) 
stood out both in its lack of enthusiasm for the UK Independence Party and the resilience 
of its Labour vote. When London’s leaders disagree with the national government, it is 
hard simply to ignore their voice. This was notably true when the GLC’s County Hall faced 
the House of Commons across the river, allowing its last regime to advertise their 
opposition to Thatcher’s economic strategy with a large-script banner displaying the 
latest unemployment figures (Buck et al., 1986, cover). Beside such symbolic / ideological 
encounters, there is also the simple point that developments in the political/economic 
capital are much more likely than elsewhere to impinge on important national (and/or 
class) interests.   
Both factors contribute to Roy Porter’s observation, looking back (during the 
interregnum) on “the perpetual tragicomic quarrel between central government and 
metropolitan powers” that:  
‘from time to time Westminster has judged the capital to require some unified 
ruling body…. But Parliament has typically lived to regret establishing such 
bodies, once they proved overmighty subjects’. (Porter, 1994, 367) 
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The other side of the picture is that, having entered such conflicts with the dominant 
authority, any capital city’s government is likely to rue the outcome. As Campbell notes:  
‘sometimes collaborating with the larger and more powerful national 
governments when interests coincide, the municipality usually loses battles 
when local and national interests conflict’ (2000, p. 16). 
 
Indeed, the prudent municipality may well choose to collaborate (openly or not), even 
when local and national interests diverge, in order to secure resources that can be 
deployed to some of those local interests.  In the London case, this is a credible 
explanation
7
 for the switch in strategy (and rhetoric) during development of the first 
Mayoral Spatial Plan, from the balanced approach of its initial LPAC-based version to 
one focused single-mindedly on the ‘global city’ segment of the CBD economy as central 
to a need to provide for ‘inevitable’ economic growth – the point being that this was 
perceived as the one route to Treasury backing for substantial infrastructure 
investment, for which the GLA had no independent resources (Gordon, 2004). If this was 
indeed the case, it was never openly argued, nor were alternative development and 
infrastructural priorities exposed during the planning (or electoral) process. But an 
implicit deal, with a much more powerful partner silently shaped a central plank of the 
London Plan (Gordon and Travers, 2010). 
 
A last dimension of (actual or potential) conflict to be considered is that between 
London and the outer regions/areas within the Greater South East. The one running 
issue in this, since the 1960s at least, has been the question of how provision for 
meeting future housing need within this super region should be balanced out between 
areas, including London’s share (and potential knock-on effects for attractive or Green 
Belt areas outside). Since creation of the GLA this has scarcely been a matter of open 
politics, as it is a given of the London Plan that it is making provision to meet projected 
housing needs for ‘its population’. There are real problems about this, since actual 
housing completion rates in London have been running well below what is required to 
meet need targets. But what might appear a fundamental flaw in the planning process is 
that no explicit regard is paid to the fact that the regions’ housing markets are closely 
integrated, and that where households settle and realise their demands depends 
essentially on choices which they make (in mostly private markets), rather than 
planners’ allocations. This seems to echo an earlier, broader observation about a 
recurring failure to recognise the powerful role played by market processes in the actual 
steering (i.e. governance) of growth within the Greater South East.  But the point here 
is that the Plan has avoided explicitly addressing these factors, and the questions they 
might raise, so as to avoid the suggestion that encouraging economic growth within 
London might have any (threatening) ramifications for neighbouring regions (Gordon 
and Travers, 2010). 
 
                                                          
7
 Alongside some direct pressure from the CBD interest group, London First 
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The likelihood that they would be seen as threatening ‘out there’ was increased by the 
creation of separate Government Office Regions for the South East and East 
(1994-2010), since internally these regions (particularly the former) had little coherence 
beyond the fact that they abutted on London, and sent many of their residents to work 
there, but didn’t want London to impinge on them further by exporting additional 
residents who might stimulate further housing development. This particular version of 
‘imagined community’ was in part an artefact of the regional structure that existed until 
2010, and there are indications since then that the government’s new localist regime 
(with its ‘duty to co-operate’) may be diffusing the issue somewhat as groups of 
authorities explore ways of addressing the relation between needs and housing market 
responses.              
 
 
 
 
 
4. Looking for a Way Forward 
After more than a century and a half London still presents a metropolitan governance 
problem with important implications for its capacity to continue growing, sustaining its 
economic role and addressing the needs of its poor – though both the geographic scale and 
substantive priorities have changed. From the provision of basic infrastructure to a compact 
core city with a radius of some 10 kms., the central issues are now ones of affordable 
housing and a sustainable transport system across a region with a radius more than 10 
times as great – as Wells (1903) had envisaged it would now be
8
. Though he was right 
(indeed remarkably prescient) about that, Wells was mistaken both in believing that a 
(rational) metropolitan perspective could simply overwhelm localism, and that a massive 
municipality for this region would be a viable and acceptable basis for its governance. What 
he missed in his forward-look was the complex, polycentric way in which the super-region 
would evolve (rather than simply expanding), and the fact that (as argued at the start of this 
chapter) that territorial governance always has involved market-type interactions and 
informal institutions, as well the intended rationality of formally authoritative.  
Indeed, interactions between each of the three types of governance process have been key 
to the way in which the Greater South East, as London’s extended functional region has 
evolved since the mid-19
th
 century, and particularly since Wells’ first appreciation of its 
potential scale. Most of the dynamic has actually come from market forces (responding to  
                                                          
8
 In principle Wells’ bounds are set by a feasible one hour commute to central London at the peak speeds he 
expects to be eventually reached around 2000, i.e. 100-115 kms. radius – yielding an area  comparable to Peter 
Hall’s (1989) Greater South East 
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changes in the forces/relations of production), rather than directly from the state. But the 
socio-spatial impacts across this region evidently reflect the way they have responded to 
state initiatives: quite directly, in the case of the development of infrastructure networks 
across the region; but more perversely, in reaction to the ‘green blanket’ spread over much 
of it during the last half of the period. How regional and local authorities have engaged with 
these market forces has also been conditioned by powerful informal institutions, in terms of 
understandings of community - where interests are shared (or not) and co-operation/ 
mobilisation is worthwhile (and not) - and beliefs about the relative roles of local versus 
social forces in shaping the varying prosperity and life-satisfaction of residents in different 
areas. In some key respects too these have been affected by the particular ways in which 
British local authorities have been funded over recent decades, with a very large (formulaic) 
contribution from national grants, intended to secure equitable service provision 
independent of local conditions and to discourage economically wasteful forms of territorial 
competition between areas – though these are now subject to radical change, in the names  
of localism and national competitiveness.            
 
Given the fact that (against Well’s rational expectations), local relations and localist values 
have continued to be salient within this mature metropolitan region, his proposed single 
tier (‘massive municipality’) governmental solution might simply be adapted - as the LCC 
was – by adding on a second tier of local governments, to deal (on the subsidiarity principle) 
with issues free of substantial spatial externalities. But two immediate political problems 
remain with this neo-Wellsian kind of regionalist solution for the Greater South East. One is 
that of legitimacy, in that (at the present time) very few people are likely to identify with 
such an extended region as (even one of) their ‘imagined communities’. The other is that - 
within an integrated UK, but still more within one eaten into by devolution/defection - the 
Greater South East simply represents too large (and too strategic) a fraction of the national 
territory and its competitive economic sectors for central government ever to allow it 
autonomy in relation to core policy areas such as those already passed to a devolved 
Scottish parliament. These are barriers not only to a purely governmental (Wellsian) 
approach to the governance issue, but also need to be taken seriously in thinking about 
broader approaches attending to the other two sides of the governance triangle.  
In the case of the legitimacy problem thee is some reason to think that this may 
substantially ease as other forms of integration grow. After all, it was only some time after 
the abolition of the GLC that a majority of outer borough residents came to see themselves 
as Londoners - with time, institutional deprivation and experience of voluntary 
collaboration all apparently playing a part (Hebbert, 1998).  In relation to legitimating 
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governance over a much wider region, the point is to work at building habits of 
co-operation, mitigating the downside costs of more active collaboration, developing a 
clearer understanding of (market) interdependences, the irrelevance of internecine 
competition to resolving (shared) structural problems etc. – by any means possible. In other 
words, to pursue adaptation of all three of the component governance processes in an 
integrated way, over a long run (rather than the artificial timescales of ambitious national 
politicians), via demonstrably useful collaborations, and accumulation of real achievements.  
This would include, for example initiatives such as the current London-Stansted-Cambridge 
consortium – not because corridors are the key geography for managing economic 
development, but because the growth potential of this one provides a really good test-bed 
for developing habits and appreciation of co-operation. Perhaps the other key consideration 
would be to look for issues where repressed/ concealed conflicts are seriously distorting the 
way in which strategic issues are addressed, and seek ways of releasing these. The Green 
Belt issue, though generally seen as the most intractable example, might now actually be 
such an example, given the crisis state which the housing supply issue has reached across 
the GSE.       
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In relation to the other problematic interface, between the (capital city) region and the central state, the 
key may not simply be to argue for closer integration of government within the GSE as crucial for 
securing national goals (with side-benefits for the prestige of national politicians). Mobilising regional 
actors around strategic priorities to secure more effective governance of this core region needs 
leadership resources – in terms of a credible capacity to commit behind key initiatives – that only high 
level central government participation (and kudos sharing) may be able to secure, preferably through an 
open process, rather than another implicit deal.        
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